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This paper studies collective choice by participants possessing private informa-
tion about the consequences of policy decisions in policymaking institutions that
involve cheap-talk communication and bargaining. The main result establishes
a connection between the extent to which problems of this type posses fully-
revealing equilibria that select policies in the full information majority rule core
(when it is well-deﬁned) and the extent to which a ﬁctitious sender-receiver game
possesses a fully revealing equilibria. This result allows us to extend Banks and
Duggan’s (2000) core equivalence results to the case of noisy policymaking en-
vironments with private information when some combination of nonexclusivity
and preference alignment conditions are satisﬁed.
1 Introduction
In many collective choice settings participants face uncertainty about the relationship be-
tween the policy levers that they can control and the eventual outcomes that they care
about. In the presence of this uncertainty participants may collect information or be chosen
on the basis of expertise. Thus, it is likely that collective choice problems also involve private
information about the uncertain relationship between policies and outcomes. In addition to
asymmetric information the participants may diﬀer in their preferences or ideologies; they
may disagree about which information contingent rule for selecting policy is optimal. The
presence of divergent preferences opens up the possibility that agents may not be willing to
reveal their information.
1I appreciate conversations with Kris Ramsay.
1Despite the canonical nature of this description, basic questions about the possibility
of eﬃciently aggregating information and preferences remain open. Much is known about
strategic behavior in policymaking institutions without uncertainty (e.g., Baron and Fere-
john, 1989; Banks and Duggan; 2000) and questions of information transmission between
agents and a principal (Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1989; Baron, 2000;
Battaglini, 2002). However, little is known about strategic behavior amongst a collective of
policymakers in the presence of asymmetric information. One might expect these consider-
ations to surface in the study of deliberative democracy, an area that political scientists have
become increasingly preoccupied with (e.g., Guttman and Thompson 1996). Unfortunately,
scholars of deliberation tend to ignore the incentives for information transmission in delib-
erative settings. The few game theoretic works that focus on incentives (Austen-Smith and
Feddersen, 2003a,b; Coughlan; 2000, Gerardi and Yariv 2003; Meirowitz 2003,2005) consider
problems in which the set of alternatives is binary and exogenously given. This paper moves
beyond existing theoretic work on deliberation, speciﬁcally, and collective choice, generally.
It considers endogenous agendas, voting, and communication in the presence of informational
asymmetries and preference divergence. More precisely, this paper investigates the extent to
which institutions that allow for cheap talk communication and bargaining over policy can
eﬀectively aggregate preferences and information.
The spatial model has become a centerpiece of the literatures on legislative politics,
agenda theory, and social choice theory. Because of this, we focus on the problem of simul-
taneously aggregating information and preferences when agents have spatial preferences over
outcomes which admit a non-empty majority rule core and agents possess private informa-
tion about a policy shock. The ﬁrst main result connects two distinct literatures – bargaining
and signalling. We establish an equivalence between the problem of ﬁnding equilibria that
reach the full information majority rule core in communication and bargaining games and
the problem of ﬁnding truthful equilibria in particular cheap-talk signalling games. Moti-
vated by this equivalence, the two results oﬀer a characterization of the preference proﬁles
and informational environments in which cheap-talk signalling games posses truthful equilib-
ria. In the case of private signals that are neither conditionally independent nor identically
distributed these results may be of particular interest.
It is amusing to note that this work brings the literature on cheap talk communication full
2circle. Crawford and Sobel (1982) motivate their path-breaking investigation of cheap-talk
signalling with a discussion of bargaining problems.
Bargainers typically have diﬀerent information about preferences and even what
is feasible. Sharing information makes available better potential agreements but
it also has strategic eﬀects that make one suspect that revealing all to an opponent
is not usually the most advantageous policy....While our primary motivations
stem from the theory of bargaining, we have found it useful to approach these
questions in a more abstract setting, which allows us to identify the essential
prerequisites for the solution we propose. (p. 1431).
While the literature on cheap talk signalling games is now quite extensive, connections
between this literature and the problem of communication and bargaining have not yet been
explored. The equivalence result presented here, moves in this direction by showing that
in the context of well behaved spatial policymaking models, the solution to a bargaining
problem with communication is ”the same as” the solution to a cheap-talk signaling game
with multiple senders.
Many of the logical steps needed for the development are present in the extant litera-
ture. An extension of Banks and Duggan’s (2000) core characterization result to the case of
common knowledge of a shock to policy leads to the conclusion that when preferences over
outcomes satisfy the Plott (1967) conditions no delay stationary Bayesian equilibria reach
the expected ideal policy of the participant with the core ideal point. Following the approach
of Myerson’s (1982) revelation principle for direct coordination mechanisms we augment the
endogenous agenda game with a round of communication, and show that the incentive com-
patibility conditions for information revelation correspond to those in a simple cheap-talk
game in which the receiver has the preferences of the core voter.2 Finally, a result in Baron
and Meirowitz (2004), and a generalization of the conditions satisﬁed in Battaglini (2002)
allow us to present necessary and suﬃcient conditions on the informational environment and
preferences for satisfaction of these incentive compatibility conditions.
2Baliga and Morris (2002) and Kim (2005) consider the value of pre-play communication in two player-
games.
32 The Model
We consider the following collective choice problem. A policy p ∈ Rd must be chosen. A
set of n (odd) participants, N, have preferences that depend on the policy, p, and a random
shock ε ∈ Rd. Participants do not observe the shock, but each i ∈ N observes a private
signal si ∈ Rd that is correlated with ε. In this setting an informational environment is a
joint distribution on the random variables (ε,s) := (ε,s1,s2,...,sn), Let F(ε,s) denote such a
joint distribution and assume that the informational environment is suﬃciently well-behaved
that for any sub vectors a and b of the random variables the conditional distribution F(a | b)
exists. Participant i has an ideal point yi ∈ Rd and preferences representable by the Bernoulli
utility function
ui(p,ε) = −kp + ε − yik
2 . (1)
The quadratic loss function and additive shock is commonly used in the literature.3 For
our purposes a particularly important property of this representation is the fact that mean-
variance analysis is appropriate. Speciﬁcally, if F(·) is a distribution function then the
extension of preferences to lotteries is representable by the Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function
Z
ui(p,ε)dF(ε) = −kp + ε − yik
2 − v (2)
where ε =
R
εdF(ε), and v =
R
(ε − ε)0(ε − ε)dF(ε) are the expectation and variance of ε
under the distribution F(·).
We draw on the extensive literature following Baron and Ferejohn (1989), and assume that
policymaking occurs in a sequential process. Speciﬁcally, we consider the simple majority
rule bargaining game of Banks and Duggan (2000). In period t = 1,2..... participant i ∈ N
is chosen with probability ρi ∈ (0,1) to make a proposal pt
i ∈ Rd. Following a proposal, the
participants simultaneously cast ballots to accept or reject the proposal. If at least n+1
2
participants vote to accept then the game ends and the policy pt
i is enacted. If at least
3Bendor and Meirowitz (2004) note that reliance on these assumptions has hurt the delegation literature
and demonstrate that the preference assumption is far less relevant than the assumption that randomness
is of this form.
4n+1
2 participants vote to reject then the game moves on to period t + 1 and the process
repeats. A termination history is then characterized by a policy pt
i and a time t, at which
the policy is enacted. The results in Banks and Duggan (2000) are most descriptive under
the assumption that agents do not discount, so we maintain this assumption. The expected









i + ε − yj

 
2 − v. (3)
Most scholars choose to focus on stationary equilibria to bargaining games of this form.
See Baron and Kalai (1993) for a justiﬁcation of this selection. A stationary strategy to the
bargaining game is a proposal pi that i will make at any history in which she is recognized
to propose and a measurable mapping vi : Rd → {accept,reject}. Thus, vi(p) speciﬁes
how i will vote if p is proposed. An equilibrium in the Banks and Duggan game involves
sequentially rational proposal strategies and voting strategies that satisfy weak dominance.





i,ε,)dF(ε) is higher than the continuation value obtained from the defeat of
proposal pt
i and equilibrium play in subsequent periods. In Banks and Duggan (2000) there
is no policy uncertainty, so that ε is commonly known to be the 0 vector. Banks and
Duggan focus on a subset of the stationary equilibria (termed no delay equilibria) that
involve agreement on a policy in the ﬁrst period. Given the simpliﬁcation aﬀorded by (3)
for a ﬁxed distribution F(ε) we can characterize the no delay equilibria in a bargaining game
with common uncertainty about the shock. A few deﬁnitions are needed ﬁrst.
Given a proﬁle of ideal points, y = (y1,y2,...,yn) ∈ Rnd the majority rule core is the set









where #A is the cardinality of the set A. In the case of no uncertainty, Plott’s (1967) result
oﬀers a characterization of the proﬁles for which the core is non-empty. With n odd, we can
restate the characterization in a convenient manner using the notion of a half space. For











The number of participants with ideal points in H
+
t (x) is denoted #H
+
t (x) = #{i ∈ N :
yi ∈ H
+
t (x)}. We say that x is a median in all directions if for every t, #H
+
t (x) < n+1
2 .
With n odd, Plott’s result can then be stated in the following simple manner: the majority
rule core coincides with the set of medians in all directions.
3 Intermediate results
With the quadratic loss function and an odd number of voters, Banks and Duggan (2004)
use the representation in (3) to show that if x is a median in all directions then the majority
preference relation over lotteries on Rd is the same as the preference relation of the participant
with ideal point x. It takes only a slight modiﬁcation of one of the proofs in Banks and
Duggan (2000) to extend the core equivalence result to bargaining games in which no agent
has private information but there is public uncertainty about the consequences of policy in
the form of a distribution F(ε).
Lemma 1 Assume that ideal points y are such that x ∈ Rd is a median in all directions.
Consider a majority rule bargaining game in which, (1) each agent is recognized with positive
probability; (2) agents do not discount; (3) there is uncertainty about the shock ε characterized
by a commonly known distribution F(ε) –so no agent possesses private information. In this
game there exists a no delay stationary equilibrium and all no delay stationary equilibria
select the policy x − ε with probability 1.
Proof: Existence follows from lemma 1 of Banks and Duggan (2000): To see this,
it is suﬃcient to note that the payoﬀs are strictly quasi-concave in p, majority
rule is proper and under the assumption that x is a median in all directions,
{x} = Cm(y˙ ). The fact that all no delay stationary equilibria yield x − ε with
probability 1 requires appeal to theorem 6 of Banks and Duggan (2000). With
ﬁxed F(ε),
R
ui(p,ε,)dF(ε) = −kp + ε − yik
2 − v and thus the payoﬀs over
lotteries are quadratic with ideal points yi− ε plus a constant scaler −v. Given
this and the fact that majority rule is strong with n odd, theorem 6 applies.
6In the remainder of the paper we assume that a median in all directions exists. Now
consider an augmented version of an endogenous agenda bargaining game with uncertainty
in which (1) agents have private information in the form of the private signals si and (2)
prior to bargaining there is a round of simultaneous communication. For a ﬁxed informa-
tion environment characterized by the joint distribution F(ε,s) and a proﬁle of preferences
characterized by y we deﬁne the hF(ε,s),yi−deliberation game as follows. In the ﬁrst
period participants make simultaneous public announcements, mi ∈ Rd, about si and then
the bargaining game is played. Analysis of this game requires that we consider an equilibrium
concept which involves sequential rationality and consistent belief formation. Accordingly,
we are interested in perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria in which conditional on beliefs about
(ε,s) voting and proposing strategies are stationary and voting strategies satisfy weak dom-
inance. A strategy for player i is then a measurable message mapping, mi : Rd → Rd,
a measurable proposal mapping, pi : Rd(n+1) → Rd, and a measurable voting mapping,
vi : Rd(n+2) → {accept,reject}. An equivalent way to conceptualize voting strategies is to
think about message contingent acceptance sets. In addition to strategies an equilibrium
requires that players have beliefs about (ε,s) conditional on the observed history. In fact
for any period t there must be two types of beliefs, those for proposers that condition on the
messages m, as well as play in previous periods and those for voters that condition on m and
the proposal pt
i and the play in previous periods. For a ﬁxed history of play up to period
t−1, ht−1, and message proﬁle m a belief for player i is then a joint distribution function on
Rd(n+1) and we use the notation µi(· | m,ht−1),µi(· | pt
j,m,ht−1) to denote such conditional
beliefs. We sometimes call an equilibrium of this form a deliberative equilibrium. If
such an equilibrium involves passage of the ﬁrst period proposal with probability 1 we call
it a no delay deliberative equilibrium.
In the remainder of the paper we focus on whether or not there exists a no delay delib-
erative equilibrium in which participants are truthful in the communication stage. We say
a deliberative equilibrium is truthful if for all i ∈ N, mi(si) = si. Since our focus is
on no delay equilibria in which the messages are truthful very few types of histories need
to be studied. We will, however, need to address beliefs following a proposal pt
i that is not
consistent with equilibrium behavior by i given the observed proﬁle of messages, because this
type of history occurs if a single agent deviates from a no delay stationary strategy proﬁle.
7First, we characterize the relationships between s and policy that are supportable in
truthful no delay deliberative equilibria. The next lemma shows that such an equilibrium
policy selection must coincide with the mapping
p
∗(s) = x −
Z
εdF(ε | s). (6)
Lemma 2 Consider an informational environment characterized by the joint distribution
F(ε,s) and assume that ideal points y are such that x ∈ Rd is a median in all directions.
Any no delay truthful deliberative equilibrium to the hF(ε,s),yi−deliberation game results
in policy selection according to the rule p∗(s) = x −
R
εdF(ε | s).
Proof: In any truthful equilibrium consistency of beliefs requires that all agents
have the same message conditional posteriors of the form F(ε | s). This and
lemma 1 yield the result.
Our goal is to show that in order to understand whether an informational environment
and preference proﬁle admit truthful deliberative equilibria it is suﬃcient to study a simpler
cheap talk signalling game in which the agents in N simultaneously submit messages to
a receiver that selects policy. For a ﬁxed information environment hF(ε,s),yi and point
x ∈ Rd we deﬁne the hF(ε,s),y,xi−signalling game as follows. In period 1 each i ∈ N
simultaneously submits a message mi ∈ Rd to a receiver, r, with ideal point x. In period 2
the receiver selects a policy p ∈ Rd. So a pure strategy for sender i is a measurable mapping
mi : Rd → Rd, a pure strategy for the receiver is a measurable mapping p : Rdn → Rd and for
each message proﬁle, a belief for the receiver is a joint distribution on Rd which we denote
by η(· | m). We focus on perfect Bayesian equilibria, requiring that message functions are
simultaneous best responses given the policy function, that the policy function is optimal for
r given the beliefs η(· | m) and that given the message functions the beliefs are consistent
with Bayes’ rule when it applies. We call such an equilibrium a signalling equilibrium
and say a signaling equilibrium is truthful if mi(si) = si for all i ∈ N. The analogue to
lemma 2 is.
Lemma 3 Consider an informational environment characterized by the joint distribution
F(ε,s). Any truthful signalling equilibrium to the hF(ε,s),y,xi−signaling game results in
8policy selection according to the rule p∗(s) = x −
R
εdF(ε | s).
Proof: The requirement that any equilibrium to the signaling game involves
consistent beliefs and sequentially rational policy selection implies that p∗(m) =
x −
R
εdF(ε | m). In a truthful equilibrium mi = si for each i ∈ N and thus,
the result attains.
4 The equivalence result
In this section we show that if given the ideal points y the point x is a median in all directions
then the hF(ε,s),yi−deliberation game possesses a truthful deliberative equilibrium if and
only if there is a truthful signaling equilibria in the hF(ε,s),y,xi−signalling game. The
subsequent section focuses on signaling games and isolates conditions on preferences and
informational environments that are necessary and suﬃcient for the existence of truthful
equilibria in either type of game.
Proposition 1 Consider an informational environment characterized by the joint distribu-
tion F(ε,s) and assume that ideal points y are such that x ∈ Rd is a median in all directions.
In the hF(ε,s),yi−deliberation game there exists a truthful no delay deliberative equilibrium
if and only if the hF(ε,s),y,xi−signalling game possesses a truthful signalling equilibrium.
Proof: Assume that x is a median in all directions.
(=⇒) Assume that in the hF(ε,s),yi−deliberation game there exists a truthful
no delay perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Let pe(m):Rnd → Rd denote the
mapping from message proﬁles into policies that results from the bargaining
strategies in this equilibrium, and let µe
i(· | m) denote the message conditional
belief of player i in the equilibrium to the deliberation game. Now suppose that
in the hF(ε,s),y,xi−signalling game the receiver uses the strategy pe(m). Since
mi(si) = si is an equilibrium strategy in the hF(ε,s),yi−deliberation game, it
must be a best response in the hF(ε,s),y,xi−signalling game if all participants
j ∈ N\i are truthful and r uses pe(m). It remains only to verify that there are
consistent beliefs for the receiver which make this strategy sequentially rational.
9Since the equilibrium to the deliberation game is truthful all participants must
form the same beliefs (i.e., µe
i(· | m) is almost surely equal to µe(· | m),∀i ∈ N)
following any m that is feasible (i.e., m is in the support of F(s).). Let η(· | m)
denote the marginal of µe(· | m) with respect to ε. Since beliefs are consistent in
the equilibrium to the deliberation game this belief is consistent in the signaling
game. By lemma 2 we have pe(m) = p∗(m) = x−
R
εdF(ε | s) = x−
R
εdµe(· | m)
and thus the receiver’s strategy is sequentially rational given the belief.
(⇐=) Assume that thehF(ε,s),y,xi−signalling game possesses a truthful perfect
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Let pE(m):Rnd → Rd denote the receiver’s strategy
and let µE(· | m) denote the receiver’s posterior in this truthful equilibrium.
Consider the strategy proﬁle to the deliberation game in which mi(si) = si,
each participant’s proposal strategy is pE(m) and each participant’s message
contingent belief is given by µE(· | m). Moreover, let the message and proposal
contingent beliefs correspond to µE(· | m). Finally, let the voting strategies of
each i satisfy weak dominance given the utility function
R
ui(p,ε,)dµE(ε | m). By
construction the beliefs are consistent and the voting strategies satisfy sequential
rationality. It remains to check that no agent has an incentive to unilaterally
deviate in the message and or proposing strategies. Since the proposal strategy
selects the unique policy that is in the majority rule core given m, any proposal
other than pE(m) will not be accepted by a majority and, thus, such a proposal
will fail. This means that if player i deviates only in her proposing strategy
the deviation will not pass and the next proposer (other than i) following the
equilibrium strategies will propose pE(m) and it will pass. Since each agents
recognition probability is less than one, when agent i is recognized and makes
a rejected proposal a diﬀerent proposer will eventually be recognized and the
proposal pE(m) will eventually be proposed and pass. This implies that the only
deviation that agent i can unilaterally make which will aﬀect her payoﬀs is to
deviate in her message, sending m0
i 6= mi. Given that everyone else plays the
conjectured strategy proﬁle, following such a deviation the resulting outcome will
be pE(m−i,m0
i) regardless of how i proposes if she is recognized. Speciﬁcally, if
10i deviates at the message level and is not recognized to propose, the equilibrium
strategies will result in the policy pE(m−i,m0
i). If i is recognized to propose and
proposes pE(m−i,m0
i) this policy will pass. The remaining possibility is that i is
recognized and proposes a policy p0 6= pE(m−i,m0
i).But unless yi = x this policy
will not be supported by a majority of voters and thus the policy pE(m−i,m0
i) will
eventually be passed. If yi = x then the equilibrium proﬁle result in i’s optimum
and the deviation cannot be desirable. Thus, the only deviation that i can make
which aﬀects her payoﬀ is to cause the policy pE(m−i,m0
i) to pass instead of the
policy pE(m). But, since thehF(ε,s),y,xi−signalling game possesses a truthful
perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, agent i weakly prefers pE(m) to pE(m−i,m0
i)
as this is the necessary incentive compatibility condition in the signaling game.
It should be noted that the equivalence does not hold for general policymaking games.
Speciﬁcally, in representing a game with communication as a mechanism it is generally
necessary to include the additional requirement that players are willing to play the game
in a prescribed manner. In Myerson (1982) there are two types of incentive compatibility
conditions: truthful and obedient. In the current problem, however, it turns out that all
unilateral deviations reach payoﬀs that are achievable through just a deviation at the message
stage and thus only the truthful conditions bind.
5 Necessary and Suﬃcient conditions for truthful equi-
libria
The remainder of the paper highlights conditions under which truthful equilibria (of either
type) exist. The exposition focuses on signalling games. In order to impose slightly more
structure we now assume that F(ε) is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure
on a convex subset of Rd. In addition, we assume that each agent’s private signal is given by
si = ε + δi where each dimension of δi is itself drawn from a distribution that is absolutely
continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure on a convex set of R1 or concentrated at 0. In
otherwords for each dimension, private signals are either perfectly informative or has a nice
density. These conditions are, for example, more general than those in Battaglini (2002,
112004), Baron (2000), Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987, 1989) and Krishna and Morgan (2001) as
both perfectly and imperfectly informed agents are allowed. We do not assume that the
individual disturbances δi are independent or identically distributed. So, some agents may
observe the same signals on some dimensions. These conditions allow us to use the spatial
structure and investigate the local incentives for agents to move policy.
A well known condition that appears in the mechanism design literature is non exclusivity
(Postlewaite and Schmeidler,1986; Palfrey and Srivastava, 1987). Let s−i denote the proﬁle
of private signals for N\{i} and let s−ij denote the proﬁle of private signals for N\{i,j}.
The informational environment F(ε,s) satisﬁes nonexclusivity if for any i ∈ N, F(ε |
s−i) = F(ε | s) for almost every s.A related but stronger condition, strong nonexclusivity is
considered by Baron and Meirowitz (2004). The informational environment F(ε,s) satisﬁes
strong nonexclusivity if for any i,j ∈ N, F(ε | s−ij) = F(ε | s) for almost every s. Thus,
in a nonexclusive environment any coalition of n − 1 participants have collectively observed
all of the available information and in a strongly nonexclusive environment any coalition of
n − 2 participants have collectively observed all of the available information.
In our setting with quadratic loss functions, the receiver only cares about learning the
distribution of the mean given s. So for our purposes, we can focus on slightly weaker con-
ditions about the conditional distributions of the expectation of ε. For any subset A ⊂ N,
let s
0
A denote the proﬁle of private signals for the participants in A.The informational envi-
ronment F(ε,s) satisﬁes mean nonexclusivity on A if for any i ∈ A,
R
εdF(ε | sA\{i}) =
R
εdF(ε | sA) for almost every s. Similarly for any A ⊂ N, mean strong nonexclusivity
on A is satisﬁed if for any i,j ∈ A,
R
εdF(ε | sA\{i,j}) =
R
εdF(ε | sA) for almost every s. In
most published work on the spatial model (Battaglini, 2004 is the exception) it is assumed
that informed agents observe perfect signals, and in this case the term mean in the above
conditions is extraneous.
We cannot focus just on the informational environment. In addition we need to consider
joint conditions on the information environment and the preference proﬁle, y. For any
subspace X of Rd let projX(si) denote the projection of si on X. For any A ⊂ N, we say
that hF(ε,s),y,xi satisfy minimal alignment on A and x if there exists a set of subspaces
{Xi}i∈A s.t. (1)
12Z
εdF(ε | {projXi(si)}i∈A) =
Z
εdF(ε | sA) (7)
for each s and (ii) for each i ∈ A, projXi(yi) = projXi(x). In otherwords, minimal alignment
on A and x is satisﬁed if all of the information available to the participants in A about the
mean of ε can be learned by observing for each i ∈ A only the projection of si on the subspace
Xi, and the receiver and i have aligned preferences on Xi. Battaglini (2002) considers the
case where all senders observe the same private information (so nonexclusivity is satisﬁed
on N) and shows that with two senders possessing ideal points that are not colinear with
the receivers’, fully revealing equilibria exist. The construction hinges on the fact that each
sender has aligned preferences with the receiver over a subspace of the outcome space. In
Battaglini’s model the requirement that ideal points are not colinear is a special case of
minimal alignment. In general, however, it is possible to construct fully-revealing equilibria
in which the receiver bases a portion of the policy decision on the information possessed by
a sender even when information violates non exclusivity. In fact the non exclusivity is not
critical to Battaglini’s result. Allowing each sender to have an informational monopoly on
the dimension of the shock on which her preferences are aligned with the receiver’s preferences
does not aﬀect the result.
We begin with a suﬃciency result.
Proposition 2 Consider an informational environment characterized by the joint distribu-
tion F(ε,s) and assume that the senders have ideal points y and the receiver has ideal point
x. Let Ax denote the set of individuals in N with ideal points not equal to x. (1) If mean
strong non exclusivity on Ax is satisﬁed then the signalling game possesses a truthful perfect
Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and if in addition the ideal points y are such that x ∈ Rd is a
median in all directions then the hF(ε,s),yi−deliberation game possesses a truthful deliber-
ative equilibrium. (2) If minimal alignment on A and x is satisﬁed then the signalling game
possesses a truthful perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and if in addition the ideal points y
are such that x ∈ Rd is a median in all directions then the hF(ε,s),yi−deliberation game
possesses a truthful deliberative equilibrium.
Proof:
13(1) For signalling games the result is an immediate consequence of proposition 3
in Baron and Meirowitz (2004). To see this consider a game between the senders
Ax and a receiver that knows sN\Ax and assume that the random shock is just the
expectation of ε. Mean strong non exclusivity in the signalling game corresponds
to strong non exclusivity in this new signaling game, and proposition 3 shows
that this game has a truthful perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The construction
relies on beliefs which render any unilateral deviation inconsequential. Given this
the result for deliberation games follows from proposition 1 above.
(2) The proof is by construction. Assume that minimal alignment on A and x
is satisﬁed. By this condition, there exists a list of subspaces{Xi}i∈Ax s.t.
Z
εdF(ε | {projXi(si)}i∈Ax) =
Z
εdF(ε | sAx) (8)
Let ηE(ε | m) = F(ε | {projXi(mi)}i∈A,mN\Ax). By minimal alignment, given
truthful strategies this deﬁnes a consistent belief for every possible m. By lemma
3, the policy function is x −
R
εdηE(ε | m), so no participant in N\Ax has an
incentive to deviate from a truthful message as the policy is optimal given the
group information. To show that no unilateral deviation is desirable assume
that for i ∈ Ax it is the case that N\{i} are truthful. Also ﬁx si and consider a
deviation m0










(i.e., the deviation aﬀects the policy outcome) then on the subspace that the















E(ε | si,s−i)) = projRd\Xi(x −
Z
εdη
E(ε | si,s−i)). (11)

















for some scalar, v. The above argument shows that if the deviation to m0
i is
payoﬀ consequential it increases the distance from policy to yi for all realizations
of s−i and thus lowers i’s expected payoﬀ. So truthful messages form a best
response. Given this, the deliberation game result follows from proposition 1.
The converse of this proposition is not true. Krishna and Morgan (2001) represents a
counterexample to the converse in which neither strong non exclusivity nor minimal align-
ment are satisﬁed. This example does, however, satisfy non exclusivity and this is critical to
the equilibrium construction. The receiver, can detect when at least one sender is lying and
chooses policy to punish this behavior. We now focus on a necessity result. This requires
combining nonexclusivity and minimal alignment. Again letting Ax denote the agents with
ideal points other than x, we say hF(ε,s),y,xi satisfy condition α if there exists two (not
necessarily disjoint) subsets of Ax, denoted B and C such that (1) minimal alignment is sat-
isﬁed on B and x and (2) mean nonexclusivity is satisﬁed on C and (3) the vectors of private
signal proﬁles from these groups (sB,sC) and N\Ax are suﬃcient to predict the expectation
of ε, speciﬁcally, Z
εdF(ε | sN\Ax,sB,sC) =
Z
εdF(ε | s). (12)
for a.e. s. Note that condition α uses mean nonexclusivity not mean strong non exclusivity.
Proposition 3 If the hF(ε,s),y,xi−signalling game possesses a truthful perfect Bayesian
Nash equilibrium then condition α is satisﬁed.
Proof: Suppose that there is a truthful equilibrium in the signalling game and
condition α is not satisﬁed. Since condition α fails, for any B ⊂ Ax on which
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satisﬁed it is the case that
Z
εdF(ε | sN\Ax,sB,sC) 6=
Z
εdF(ε | s) (13)
for a set of proﬁles s with positive measure. However, since a truthful equilibrium
exists in the hF(ε,s),yi−signalling game it is the case that for at least one
such selection of B and C it is the case that a non-empty set of agents, R =
N\{N\Ax ∪ B ∪ C}, are willing to reveal their private information and this
information inﬂuences the ﬁnal policy. Since condition α is not satisﬁed, if we
take B,C,R and modify them such that R0 is the smallest (by set inclusion)
set containing agents that cannot be moved to B0 or C0 while maintaining the
assumption that minimal alignment is satisﬁed on B0 and mean non-exclusivity is
satisﬁed on C0 the resulting R0 is non empty. Since we have assumed a truthful
equilibrium exists it must be the case that in a signaling game between the
agents R0 and a receiver with ideal point x observing (sN\Ax,sB0,sC0) a truthful
equilibrium exists. To derive a contradiction from this conclusion we consider
such a signalling game and the incentives of the senders in R0. Consider an
agent i ∈ R0 who’s information is not redundant, meaning
Z
εdF(ε | sN\Ax,sB0,sC0,sR0\{i}) 6=
Z
εdF(ε | s). (14)
Such an i must exist or else we will have shown that condition α is satisﬁed.
Assume that all senders j ∈ R0\{i} are truthful. Since i ∈ R0 it is the case
that (1) i ∈ Ax and thus yi 6= x and (2) it is not possible to ﬁnd a set of agents
that observe the information contained in si and on which mean nonexclusivity
is satisﬁed. Given that si = ε + δi these 2 conclusions and lemma 3 imply that
for some subspace X of Rd, in the truthful equilibrium
p
∗(m−i,mi) = x −
Z
εdF(ε | s−i,projX(mi)) (15)





yi − x −
Z Z






is optimized by mi = si. Given the assumptions on the distributions,
R R
εdF(ε |
s−i,projX(mi))dF(s−i | si) is continuous in mi. This and the fact that mi = si is
an optimizer means that projX(x) = projX(yi). But this implies that i can be
added to the set B, contradicting the conclusion that i ∈ R0. Thus, condition α
is satisﬁed or the truthful equilibrium does not exist.
One point worth noting is that proposition 2 does not require si = ε+δi or the absolute
continuity assumptions. Proposition 3 does, however, rely on these assumptions. With-
out them it is possible to come up with settings that posses truthful equilibria but violate
condition α. One unidimensional example involves one sender with ideal point y1 = 1, a
receiver with ideal point x = 0, a shock taking possible values ε ∈ {−3,3}, and a perfectly
informative signal s1 = ε.If the sender is truthful, and the receiver selects a sequentially ra-
tional policy given the message the sender’s utility is 1 in either state. However, a deviation
by the sender results in a sender utility of either −49 or −25 depending on the realization
of ε. Thus, a truthful equilibrium exists but condition α is not satisﬁed. It should also
be noted that proposition 2, suﬃciency, can be extended to a modiﬁed version of condition
α – with the second condition using mean strong nonexclusivity. This result follows from
proposition 2, if we consider 2 separate signalling games, one between the receiver and the
agents on which mean strong nonexclusivity is satisﬁed, and the other between the receiver
and the agents on which minimal alignment is satisﬁed.
6 Conclusion
Bargaining problems in which agents posses private information and are allowed to commu-
nicate may posses large equilibrium sets. Moreover, in these problems it is diﬃcult to asses
the extent to which information sharing is possible. However, when agents are patient and
preferences satisfy the Plott conditions, we can answer questions about the possibility of full
17information revelation by analyzing sender-receiver models. It is easy to demonstrate this
point in the case of a unidimensional policy space and smooth shocks. Cheap talk communi-
cation and bargaining can result in policy selection that is optimal for the median committee
member only if all pieces of information are observed by at least two committee members.
Equivalently in sender-receiver models like Krishna and Morgan (2001) in which the players
have distinct ideal points on the line, fully-revealing equilibria only exist if any information
that is observed by one sender and not the receiver is also observed by another sender. A sec-
ond informative example involves a two dimensional policy space with 5 committee members
possessing the ideal points y0 = (0,0), y1 = (2,0), y2 = (1,2), y3 = (−1,0), y4 = (−2,−4).
Is there an equilibrium to the communication and bargaining game which aggregates all of
the available private information to select agent 0’s favorite policy, −
R
εdF(ε | s)? We
ﬁnd that such an equilibrium exists in the bargaining and communication game if and only
if there is a truthful equilibrium in a signalling game in which agents 1,2,3,4, are senders
and agent 0 is the receiver. This is the case if, for example, each dimension of the shock is
observed by three agents or one of the odd indexed agents observes the ﬁrst coordinate and
one of the even indexed agents observes the second coordinate. In general, combinations of
non exclusivity and preference alignment conditions are necessary for truthful equilibria.
While progress has been made in understanding when truthful equilibria exist for ”nice
preference proﬁles”, this paper addresses only a small set of the questions pertaining to
policymaking in the spatial model. Since the presence of a non-empty majority rule core
is non-generic, questions about the possibility of aggregation when the Plott conditions are
not satisﬁed need to be answered. While Banks and Duggan (2000) present results about
the upper hemicontinuity of the equilibrium correspondence, the approach taken here does
not seem particularly applicable to the study of communication and bargaining in settings
that are ”close” to ones in which the Plott conditions are satisﬁed. Results about proﬁles
that do not satisfy the Plott conditions are likely to hinge on analysis of partially-revealing
equilibria, a direction that is left for future work.
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